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An interlocking-directorates monitoring system

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  • Pawlak Marek

    (Institute of Economics and Management, The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Al. Racławickie 14, C-558, 20-950 Lublin)

Abstract

The subject of the study was interlocking directorates in Polish joint stock companies. In order to explore this area a monitoring system has been developed which consists of a database and query system. Data is automatically introduced from printed announcements into the MySQL database using PHP scripts.The phenomenon of interlocking directorates in Polish joint stock companies is comparable with other countries. Board members in Poland are significantly younger than, for example, in the USA. Women constitute an important group of board members. Insurance companies and investment funds are closely connected with other companies, but banks are not.The monitoring system developed enables us to identify who is, and who was, a board member of every joint stock company. It also enables us to identify, for every person, which board he or she now serves on, and has served on, in the past. The system also enables us to produce different reports concerning, for example, changes in certain indexes in subsequent years. The system is also accessible via the Internet.

Suggested Citation

  • Pawlak Marek, 2010. "An interlocking-directorates monitoring system," Journal for Perspectives of Economic Political and Social Integration, Sciendo, vol. 16(1-2), pages 121-154, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:vrs:jpepsi:v:16:y:2010:i:1-2:p:121-154:n:5
    DOI: 10.2478/v10241-012-0005-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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