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Informal Care and the Division of End-of-Life Transfers

  • Meta Brown

Unmarried parents in the AHEAD study derive the majority of their longterm care hours from their children, and childcaregivers are generally unpaid. This paper examines the extent to which the division of end-of-life transfers compensates caregiving children. In a model of siblings’ altruistic contribution of care to a shared parent, the parent’s estate division is found to influence total family care, even where care contingencies are unenforced. Evidence in the AHEAD data that end-of-life transfers favor both current and expected caregivers, and that children make altruistic but resourceconstrained caregiving decisions, is consistent with a theory of estate division in which planned end-of-life transfers elicit care from altruistic children.

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Article provided by University of Wisconsin Press in its journal Journal of Human Resources.

Volume (Year): 41 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 ()

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Handle: RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:41:y:2006:i:1:p191-219
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  1. Cox, Donald, 1987. "Motives for Private Income Transfers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(3), pages 508-46, June.
  2. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 57-73, February.
  3. Liliana E. Pezzin & Barbara Steinberg Schone, 1999. "Intergenerational Household Formation, Female Labor Supply and Informal Caregiving: A Bargaining Approach," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 34(3), pages 475-503.
  4. Joseph G. Altonji & Fumio Hayashi & Laurence Kotlikoff, 1995. "Parental Altruism and Inter Vivos Transfers: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 5378, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Charles Yuji Horioka, 2001. "Are the Japanese Selfish, Altruistic, or Dynastic?," NBER Working Papers 8577, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Audrey Light & Kathleen McGarry, 2003. "Why Parents Play Favorites: Explanations for Unequal Bequests," NBER Working Papers 9745, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Joseph G. Altonji & Todd E. Elder & Christopher R. Taber, 2005. "Selection on Observed and Unobserved Variables: Assessing the Effectiveness of Catholic Schools," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(1), pages 151-184, February.
  8. Evans, William N & Schwab, Robert M, 1995. "Finishing High School and Starting College: Do Catholic Schools Make a Difference?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(4), pages 941-74, November.
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