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State Effectiveness and Structural Traps: Some Colonial Experiences

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  • Richard Grabowski

    (Department of Economics, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, United States of America)

Abstract

A multiple equilibriums poverty trap model is developed to analyse the effectiveness of State policy in developing and applying policies aimed at reducing poverty, i.e. pro-poor policies. The implication of this model is that, if poverty is concentrated in agriculture, then a necessary key to breaking out of the low level trap situation (where the State is ineffective in carrying out pro-poor policy) is the creation of a backlog of agricultural technology. However, for this technology to be activated and applied by the State requires that the ruling elite feel themselves to be vulnerable in terms of controlling the institutions of the State. The workings of the model are illustrated by examining the colonial experiences of Taiwan Province of China and the Republic of Korea and comparing it to that of South-East Asia.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Grabowski, 2010. "State Effectiveness and Structural Traps: Some Colonial Experiences," Asia-Pacific Development Journal, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), vol. 17(1), pages 1-25, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:unt:jnapdj:v:17:y:2010:i:1:p:1-25
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