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Estimating the Costs of Filing Tax Returns and the Potential Savings from Policies Aimed at Reducing These Costs

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  • Youssef Benzarti

Abstract

This paper estimates the cost of filing taxes and assesses several policy proposals aimed at reducing these costs. Using US tax returns, a quasi-experimental method, and additional extrapolations based on survey evidence, I uncover three main findings. First, filing costs are large and have been steadily increasing over time. Second, part of this increase in filing costs can be attributed to an increase in the number of schedules filed per taxpayer. Third, prepopulating tax returns and offering free filing options can result in substantial cost savings for taxpayers.

Suggested Citation

  • Youssef Benzarti, 2021. "Estimating the Costs of Filing Tax Returns and the Potential Savings from Policies Aimed at Reducing These Costs," Tax Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 55-85.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:tpolec:doi:10.1086/713493
    DOI: 10.1086/713493
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    Cited by:

    1. Tobias Hauck & Luisa Wallossek, 2021. "Automatische Einkommensteuererstattungen zur Entlastung niedriger Einkommen [Automatic Income Tax Refunds to Relieve Low Incomes]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 101(12), pages 956-959, December.
    2. Hauck, Tobias & Wallossek, Luisa, 2024. "Optional (non-)filing and effective taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 238(C).
    3. Siamand Hesami & Hatice Jenkins & Glenn P. Jenkins, 2024. "Digital Transformation of Tax Administration and Compliance: A Systematic Literature Review on E-Invoicing and Prefilled Returns," Development Discussion Papers 2023-14, JDI Executive Programs.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H0 - Public Economics - - General
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General

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