The Effects of Changes in Tax Laws on Corporate Reorganization Activity
The authors present evidence that changes in tax laws passed in the 1980s had a first-order effect on merger and acquisition activity in the United States. They also present evidence of increased reliance on certain institutional arrangements (unit-management buyouts and going-private transactions) that were destined to reduce the nontax costs of reorganization. Their model predicts and their evidence confirms that while the Tax Reform Act of 1986 discouraged transactions among U.S. corporations, it increased the demand for merger and acquisition transactions between U.S. sellers and foreign buyers. Copyright 1990 by the University of Chicago.
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- Alan J. Auerbach & James M. Poterba, 1986.
"Tax Loss Carryforwards and Corporate Tax Incentives,"
413, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Alan J. Auerbach & James M. Poterba, 1987. "Tax Loss Carryforwards and Corporate Tax Incentives," NBER Chapters, in: The Effects of Taxation on Capital Accumulation, pages 305-342 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alan J. Auerbach & James M. Poterba, 1986. "Tax Loss Carryforwards and Corporate Tax Incentives," NBER Working Papers 1863, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Schipper, Katherine & Thompson, Rex, 1983. "Evidence on the capitalized value of merger activity for acquiring firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 85-119, April.
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