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Creditor Protection Laws and the Cost of Debt

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  • Sattar A. Mansi
  • William F. Maxwell
  • John K. Wald

Abstract

We examine the impact of state payout restrictions on firms' credit ratings and bond yields. Using publicly traded bond data for a sample of large firms, we find that firms incorporated in states with more restrictive payout statutes (for example, New York and California) have better credit ratings and significantly lower yield spreads (about 8.7 percent) than do firms incorporated in less restrictive states (for example, Delaware). These results suggest that incorporation in a more restrictive state provides a credible commitment mechanism for avoiding some of the moral hazard problems associated with long-term debt. This commitment corresponds to an economically and statistically significant difference in market yields and firm-financing costs and is robust to controls for ownership, governance, debt type, Delaware or non-Delaware incorporation, and covenant usage. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that Delaware incorporation has hidden costs for some firms. (c) 2009 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

Suggested Citation

  • Sattar A. Mansi & William F. Maxwell & John K. Wald, 2009. "Creditor Protection Laws and the Cost of Debt," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(4), pages 701-717, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:52:y:2009:i:4:p:701-717
    DOI: 10.1086/605566
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    Cited by:

    1. Hami Amiraslani & Karl V. Lins & Henri Servaes & Ane Tamayo, 2023. "Trust, social capital, and the bond market benefits of ESG performance," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 421-462, June.
    2. Aguir, Iness & Burns, Natasha & Mansi, Sattar A. & Wald, John K., 2014. "Liability protection, director compensation, and incentives," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 570-589.
    3. John Wald & Sattar Mansi & Anh Nguyen, 2012. "Golden Parachutes, Incentives, and the Cost of Debt," Working Papers 0008, College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio.
    4. Khalil, Samer & Mansi, Sattar & Mazboudi, Mohamad & Zhang, Andrew (Jianzhong), 2019. "Information asymmetry and the wealth appropriation effect in the bond market: Evidence from late disclosures," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 49-61.
    5. Eidenmüller, Horst & Engert, Andreas & Hornuf, Lars, 2015. "Where do firms issue debt? An empirical analysis of issuer location and regulatory competition in Europe," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 103-115.
    6. Servaes, Henri & Amiraslani, Hami & Lins, Karl & Tamayo, Ane, 2017. "A Matter of Trust? The Bond Market Benefits of Corporate Social Capital during the Financial Crisis," CEPR Discussion Papers 12321, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Mansi, Sattar A. & Wald, John K. & Zhang, Andrew (Jianzhong), 2016. "Severance agreements and the cost of debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 426-444.
    8. Colleen Honigsberg & Sharon P. Katz & Sunay Mutlu & Gil Sadka, 2021. "State contract law and the use of accounting information in debt contracts," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 124-171, March.
    9. Jagannathan, Murali & Pritchard, A.C., 2017. "Do Delaware CEOs get fired?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 85-101.
    10. Bradley, Michael & Chen, Dong, 2011. "Corporate governance and the cost of debt: Evidence from director limited liability and indemnification provisions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 83-107, February.
    11. Giofré, Maela/M., 2009. "Investor protection and foreign stakeholders," MPRA Paper 20238, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2010.
    12. Giofré, Maela, 2013. "Investor protection rights and foreign investment," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 506-526.
    13. Reisel, Natalia, 2014. "On the value of restrictive covenants: Empirical investigation of public bond issues," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 251-268.
    14. Mark Wallis, 2021. "The effects of relaxing Australia’s statutory dividend restrictions," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(2), pages 3685-3733, June.
    15. Liu, Yixin & Jiraporn, Pornsit, 2010. "The effect of CEO power on bond ratings and yields," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 744-762, September.
    16. Ballester, Laura & González-Urteaga, Ana & Martínez, Beatriz, 2020. "The role of internal corporate governance mechanisms on default risk: A systematic review for different institutional settings," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    17. Colleen Honigsberg & Sharon Katz & Gil Sadka, 2014. "State Contract Law and Debt Contracts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(4), pages 1031-1061.

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