Régulation Et Développement : Une Analyse Théorique À Partir De L’Enforcement Et La Séparation Des Pouvoirs
This paper is an attempt to analyze regulation in LDCs taking into account their specificities compared to developed countries. By using a regulation model with an imperfect contract enforcement mechanism, we show how the separation of powers improves the enforcement quality and social welfare in an environment fraught with corruption.
Volume (Year): 28 (2008)
Issue (Month): ()
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- Stefan Krasa & Anne P. Villamil, 2000. "Optimal Contracts when Enforcement Is a Decision Variable," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 119-134, January.
- Laffont,Jean-Jacques, 2005.
"Regulation and Development,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521549486, November.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Meleu, Mathieu, 2001. "Separation of powers and development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 129-145, February.
- Loeb, Martin & Magat, Wesley A, 1979. "A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 399-404, October.
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