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Régulation Et Développement : Une Analyse Théorique À Partir De L’Enforcement Et La Séparation Des Pouvoirs

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  • Daouda DIAKITÉ

    () (Toulouse School of Economics)

Abstract

This paper is an attempt to analyze regulation in LDCs taking into account their specificities compared to developed countries. By using a regulation model with an imperfect contract enforcement mechanism, we show how the separation of powers improves the enforcement quality and social welfare in an environment fraught with corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Daouda DIAKITÉ, 2008. "Régulation Et Développement : Une Analyse Théorique À Partir De L’Enforcement Et La Séparation Des Pouvoirs," Region et Developpement, Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var, vol. 28, pages 181-206.
  • Handle: RePEc:tou:journl:v:28:y:2008:p:181-206
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    File URL: http://region-developpement.univ-tln.fr/fr/pdf/R28/9-Diakite.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Meleu, Mathieu, 2001. "Separation of powers and development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, pages 129-145.
    2. Laffont,Jean-Jacques, 2005. "Regulation and Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521840187, November.
    3. Loeb, Martin & Magat, Wesley A, 1979. "A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 399-404, October.
    4. Stefan Krasa & Anne P. Villamil, 2000. "Optimal Contracts when Enforcement Is a Decision Variable," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 119-134, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    JEUX NON COOPÉRATIFS; THÉORIE DU MARCHANDAGE (BARGAINING); ASYMÉTRIE D’INFORMATION ET INFORMATION PRIVÉE; ÉCONOMIE DE LA RÉGULATION;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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