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Strategic disclosure in networks

Author

Listed:
  • Squintani, Francesco

    (Department of Economics, University of Warwick)

Abstract

I study strategic transmission of verifiable information through intermediaries, and find that equilibrium full disclosure requires that all players are biased in the same direction relative to the decision maker. By embedding this strategic disclosure game into networks, I explore the intersection of information transmission in networks and strategic communication---two major economic theory research strands. When each networked player may hold information useful for any other's decision, I find that the unique ex-ante optimal network is a line where players are ordered by their bliss points. This is also the unique network immune to coalitional deviations.

Suggested Citation

  • Squintani, Francesco, 0. "Strategic disclosure in networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:6446
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marco Battaglini, 2002. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1379-1401, July.
    2. Galperti, Simone & Perego, Jacopo, 2025. "Games with information constraints: seeds and spillovers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 20(2), May.
    3. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Communication via a strategic mediator," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 869-884, March.
    4. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Nemanja Antic & Harry Pei, 2026. "Selective Disclosure in Overlapping Generations," Papers 2602.09406, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2026.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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