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On bargaining norms as solutions to cost-minimization problems

Author

Listed:
  • Tatur, Tymon

    (Department of Economics, University of Bonn)

Abstract

This paper studies bargaining outcomes in economies in which agents may be able to impose outcomes that deviate from the relevant social norms but incur costs when they do so. It characterizes bargaining outcomes that are easiest for a society to sustain as part of a social norm which everybody will want to follow. Depending on technological assumptions, the approach yields the Nash bargaining solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, the equal monetary split, and other bargaining solutions. Set-valued solution concepts are derived that are relevant if one is unable or unwilling to make specific technological assumptions.

Suggested Citation

  • Tatur, Tymon, 0. "On bargaining norms as solutions to cost-minimization problems," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:4451
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    File URL: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewForthcomingFile/4451/39011/1
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining; social norms; sanctions; internalised norms; bargaining solutions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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