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An examination of Frank Wolak's model of market power and its application to the New Zealand electricity market

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  • Lewis Evans
  • Graeme Guthrie

Abstract

We appraise the theoretical basis and the consequent empirical work of Frank Wolak in his study of the New Zealand electricity market in a report to the New Zealand Commerce Commission released in March 2009. The report found no multilateral actions, but concluded there was evidence of unilateral market power. We find that the theoretical and empirical methodologies employed to reach this conclusion do not imply the existence of unilateral market power in oligoply electricity markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Lewis Evans & Graeme Guthrie, 2012. "An examination of Frank Wolak's model of market power and its application to the New Zealand electricity market," New Zealand Economic Papers, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(1), pages 25-34, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:nzecpp:v:46:y:2012:i:1:p:25-34
    DOI: 10.1080/00779954.2011.647504
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lewis Evans & Graeme Guthrie, 2009. "How Options Provided by Storage Affect Electricity Prices," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 681-702, January.
    2. Shaun D. MCRAE & Frank A. WOLAK, 2009. "How Do Firms Exercise Unilateral Market Power? Evidence from a Bid-Based Wholesale Electricity Market," RSCAS Working Papers 2009/36, European University Institute.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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