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Market as a Weapon: Domination by Virtue of a Constellation of Interests

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  • Anton Oleinik

Abstract

The neoclassical approach toward explaining domination in the market is confronted with the approach of critical theory. Special attention is paid to domination by virtue of a constellation of interests in the market. This requires a particular technique for imposing will, namely conditional access to the market field. Interactions are modeled taking a field of domination composed of three organizational actors, one of them performing the function of drawing boundaries and controlling access. The concept of territoriality as spatially embedded power is applied to organization studies. Only one actor in the field has the ability to maximize its satisfaction, the two others minimize missed opportunities.

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  • Anton Oleinik, 2011. "Market as a Weapon: Domination by Virtue of a Constellation of Interests," Forum for Social Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(2), pages 157-177, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:fosoec:v:40:y:2011:i:2:p:157-177
    DOI: 10.1007/s12143-010-9081-6
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