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Evaluating Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, With Applications To The Israeli-Syrian And The North Versus South Korean Conflicts

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Listed:
  • Kobi Kagan
  • Alon Levkowitz
  • Asher Tishler
  • Avi Weiss

Abstract

This study evaluates the order of magnitude of the monetary cost of achieving an international strategic limitation agreement on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in an asymmetric arms race, with applications to the Israeli-Syrian and the North versus South Korean conflicts. It extends the Kagan et al. (2005) framework and develops a model of resource allocation between expenditure on civilian government consumption and on security in a non-cooperative (Cournot) arms race between a developed country and a less-developed country. The model is used to predict the optimal mix of weapons of the two countries engaged in the arms race, and to evaluate the applicability of international strategic WMD limitation agreements. Applying the model to the arms race between Israel and Syria shows that if considered from a purely monetary perspective, such an agreement, in which the monetary transfer to Syria is made by either Israel or a third party, is within reach. A strategic agreement to limit North Korea's WMD is also economically feasible, but only when the monetary transfer to North Korea is shouldered by a third party such as the USA or a coalition of neighboring countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Kobi Kagan & Alon Levkowitz & Asher Tishler & Avi Weiss, 2009. "Evaluating Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, With Applications To The Israeli-Syrian And The North Versus South Korean Conflicts," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(2), pages 95-121.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:20:y:2009:i:2:p:95-121
    DOI: 10.1080/10242690801923132
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sandler,Todd & Hartley,Keith, 1999. "The Political Economy of NATO," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521630931.
    2. Sandler, Todd & Hartley, Keith, 1999. "The Political Economy of Nato: Past, Present, and into the 21st Century," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1441, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ronen Bar-El & Kobi Kagan & Asher Tishler, 2010. "Forward-Looking versus Shortsighted Defense Budget Allocation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(4), pages 638-662, August.

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