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An econometric evaluation of the effect of firing a coach on team performance

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  • R. H. Koning

Abstract

Firing the manager is a drastic measure employed by firms to deal with poor performance. However, data on within-firm dynamics are scarce, and the firing of individual managers is rarely recorded in the firm level data currently available. This makes the value of firing a manager difficult to assess. Data on sports offer a unique opportunity to study this phenomenon because the firing of a coach is usually well-publicized. Using data on soccer, the author evaluates the effect of the firing of a coach on team performance. As teams do not face the same opponents before and after a coach is fired, the issue of sample selectivity is addressed.

Suggested Citation

  • R. H. Koning, 2003. "An econometric evaluation of the effect of firing a coach on team performance," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(5), pages 555-564.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:35:y:2003:i:5:p:555-564
    DOI: 10.1080/0003684022000015946
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Warner, Jerold B. & Watts, Ross L. & Wruck, Karen H., 1988. "Stock prices and top management changes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 461-492, January.
    2. Denis, David J & Denis, Diane K, 1995. "Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(4), pages 1029-1057, September.
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