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The effect of a potential borrower's reporting reputation and financial condition on commercial loan officers' estimates of forecast bias and subsequent loan recommendations

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  • Richard Houston
  • Michael Peters

Abstract

This paper investigates whether a potential borrower's reporting reputation and financial condition affect commercial loan officers' loan judgments and recommendations after receiving an earnings forecast that predicts improved financial performance. The results suggest that the earnings forecast is perceived as more credible in the presence of (1) a reputation for objective reporting, and (2) strong financial condition. Also, a reputation for objective reporting allowed the borrower to more credibly convey the expected improvement in performance when financial condition was weak. However, while financial condition predictably affects loan recommendations (likelihood of granting the loan, interest rate), reporting reputation does not. While we find that commercial loan officers discount forecasts under similar circumstances as stock analysts, results suggest that the consequences of developing a reputation for aggressive reporting (e.g., aggressive selection of accounting methods and estimates within GAAP) may be greater in a stock valuation setting (prior research documents lower stock prices) than in a loan setting.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Houston & Michael Peters, 2001. "The effect of a potential borrower's reporting reputation and financial condition on commercial loan officers' estimates of forecast bias and subsequent loan recommendations," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(3), pages 163-174.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:acctbr:v:31:y:2001:i:3:p:163-174
    DOI: 10.1080/00014788.2001.9729612
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    References listed on IDEAS

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