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Financial distress, corporate borrowing, and industrial decline: the Lancashire cotton spinning industry, 1918-38

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  • David Higgins
  • Steve Toms

Abstract

The analysis presented is based on a case study of Lancashire cotton textile firms. It traces their financial history through the sharp boom of 1919-20, and the sudden crisis that followed. Using a sample of representative companies it is shown that firms unwittingly adopted inappropriate financial structures that acted as the decisive constraint on the adoption of recovery strategies in the subsequent slump. The paper explains how the relationship between indebtedness and asset values prevented subsequent internal financial retrenchment, restructuring and re-equipment, and dictated the competitive processes within the industry. It is demonstrated that financial constraints were the decisive factor determining the feasibility of competitive strategies available to the industry's leaders.

Suggested Citation

  • David Higgins & Steve Toms, 2003. "Financial distress, corporate borrowing, and industrial decline: the Lancashire cotton spinning industry, 1918-38," Accounting History Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(2), pages 207-232.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:acbsfi:v:13:y:2003:i:2:p:207-232
    DOI: 10.1080/0958520032000084996
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Toms, Steven, 2005. "Financial control, managerial control and accountability: evidence from the British Cotton Industry, 1700-2000," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 30(7-8), pages 627-653.
    2. Gregor Semieniuk & Emanuele Campiglio & Jean‐Francois Mercure & Ulrich Volz & Neil R. Edwards, 2021. "Low‐carbon transition risks for finance," Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(1), January.
    3. Ekote Nelson Nnoko & Yuji Maeda, 2023. "Impacts and risks of borrowing on corporate performance: evidence from Japan and Sub-Saharan Africa," Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional Science, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 119-133, March.

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