Compliance With Modern Legislations Of Corporate Governance And Its Implementation In Companies
Corporate governance is a key element for improvement of investors' confidence, increase of competitiveness and improvement of economic growth. Corporate governance is on the top of agenda for international development as stated by James Wolfensohn (1998) that "the governance of the corporation is now as important in the world economy as the government of countries". Modern legislations of corporate governance is based on vast experiences from good practices and corporate scandals from many countries and presents standards for governance of companies accepted by investors, governments, companies and other stakeholders. Compliance with modern legislations of corporate governance is important for every company and government in order to grow, develop, attract investors, lower risks and avoid corporate scandals and lawsuits. In the paper it will be discussed about the compliance of legislations of the Republic of Srpska with modern legislations of corporate governance. Moreover, the paper will analyze implementation of corporate governance principles and legislations in companies in the Republic of Srpska. The results of implementation of the principles of corporate governance in companies in the Republic of Srpska will be presented using the Scorecard analysis for evaluation of the implementation of (good) practices and principles of corporate governance in companies which are listed on the Official market of the Banja Luka Stock Exchange.
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