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Measuring Corruption Risk in Public Procurement over Emergency Periods

Author

Listed:
  • Michela Gnaldi

    (University of Perugia)

  • Simone Del Sarto

    (University of Perugia)

Abstract

Times of crisis provide fertile ground for corruption because of looser regulatory frameworks, weaker oversight, and skyrocketing financing levels. Public procurement systems are particularly vulnerable to corruption risks over emergency periods as they are at the frontline of many country responses to crises. In this paper, we propose a curated selection of red flag indicators of corruption risk over crises and discuss a general measurement framework for their computation. The proposed approach exploits the time discontinuity introduced by a crisis and allows us to characterise and differentiate companies and/or contracting authorities with different degree of risk through statistical testing. The suggested framework is intended to accommodate the changing and far-reaching corruption risks induced by crises and mitigate them effectively.

Suggested Citation

  • Michela Gnaldi & Simone Del Sarto, 2024. "Measuring Corruption Risk in Public Procurement over Emergency Periods," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 859-877, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:soinre:v:172:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s11205-024-03331-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s11205-024-03331-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gallego, Jorge & Rivero, Gonzalo & Martínez, Juan, 2021. "Preventing rather than punishing: An early warning model of malfeasance in public procurement," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 360-377.
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    4. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Straub, Stéphane & Flochel, Thomas, 2016. "Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 395-407.
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