IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/sjobre/v63y2011i6d10.1007_bf03372853.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Ökonomische Konse quenzen der Mitgliedschaft ehemaliger Vorstandsmitglieder im Aufsichtsrat: Eine empirische Analyse

Author

Listed:
  • Jens Grigoleit

    (wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter, beide Technische Universität Bergakademie)

  • Michael Nippa

    (Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehre, speziell Unternehmensführung und Personalwesen)

  • Thomas Steger

    (Universität Regensburg)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Anhand eines die Jahre 1999 bis 2008 umfassenden Paneldatensatzes für die 300 wichtigsten börsennotierten Unternehmen Deutschlands wird untersucht, ob ein Zusammenhang zwischen der Mitgliedschaft ehemaliger Vorstandsmitglieder im Aufsichtsrat und der Unternehmensleistung beziehungsweise der Bewertung des Unternehmens durch den Kapitalmarkt besteht. Im Ergebnis finden sich keine Belege für einen statistisch signifikanten Einfluss ehemaliger Vorstandsmitglieder im Aufsichtsrat. Somit lassen sich weder die Argumente der Gegner noch die der Befürworter einer Berufung me hemaliger Vorstandsmitglieder in den Aufsichtsrat empirisch bestätigen

Suggested Citation

  • Jens Grigoleit & Michael Nippa & Thomas Steger, 2011. "Ökonomische Konse quenzen der Mitgliedschaft ehemaliger Vorstandsmitglieder im Aufsichtsrat: Eine empirische Analyse," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 63(6), pages 578-608, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:63:y:2011:i:6:d:10.1007_bf03372853
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03372853
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF03372853
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/BF03372853?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eugene Kang & Asghar Zardkoohi, 2005. "Board Leadership Structure and Firm Performance," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(6), pages 785-799, November.
    2. Franks, Julian & Mayer, Colin, 2001. "Ownership and Control of German Corporations," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(4), pages 943-977.
    3. Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, "undated". "Yes, Managers Should be Paid Like Bureaucrats," IEW - Working Papers 187, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    4. Agrawal, Anup & Knoeber, Charles R., 1996. "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(3), pages 377-397, September.
    5. Dittmann, I. & Maug, E. & Schneider, Christoph, 2010. "Bankers on boards of German firms : What they do, what they are worth, and why they are (still) there," Other publications TiSEM 610cf1b5-ae96-4112-9ff3-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Axel Werder, 2011. "Neue Entwicklungen der Corporate Governance in Deutschland," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 48-62, February.
    7. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    8. Ingolf Dittmann & Ernst Maug & Christoph Schneider, 2010. "Bankers on the Boards of German Firms: What They Do, What They Are Worth, and Why They Are (Still) There," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 14(1), pages 35-71.
    9. Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, "undated". "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders (Revision of 29-94)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 8-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    10. Markus M. schmid & Heinz Zimmermann, 2008. "Should Chairman and CEO be Separated? Leadership Structure and Firm Performance in Switzerland," Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 60(2), pages 182-204, April.
    11. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    12. Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, 2007. "A Theory of Friendly Boards," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(1), pages 217-250, February.
    13. Brickley, James A. & Coles, Jeffrey L. & Jarrell, Gregg, 1997. "Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 189-220, June.
    14. Dan L. Worrell & Carol Nemec & Wallace N. Davidson Iii, 1997. "One Hat Too Many: Key Executive Plurality And Shareholder Wealth," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(6), pages 499-507, June.
    15. Melinda Muth & Lex Donaldson, 1998. "Stewardship Theory and Board Structure: a contingency approach," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 5-28, January.
    16. Andres, Christian, 2008. "Large shareholders and firm performance--An empirical examination of founding-family ownership," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 431-445, September.
    17. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    18. Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, "undated". "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders (Revision of 29-94)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 08-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    19. Klaus Gugler & Jurgen Weigand, 2003. "Is ownership really endogenous?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(8), pages 483-486.
    20. Brian K. Boyd, 1995. "CEO duality and firm performance: A contingency model," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(4), pages 301-312.
    21. Pi, Lynn & Timme, Stephen G., 1993. "Corporate control and bank efficiency," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2-3), pages 515-530, April.
    22. Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Naeem Tabassum & Satwinder Singh, 2020. "Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-030-48527-6, November.
    2. James, Hui Liang & Borah, Nilakshi & Lirely, Roger, 2022. "The effectiveness of board independence in high-discretion firms," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 103-117.
    3. Martin Kyere & Marcel Ausloos, 2021. "Corporate governance and firms financial performance in the United Kingdom," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(2), pages 1871-1885, April.
    4. Volonté, Christophe, 2015. "Boards: Independent and committed directors?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 25-37.
    5. Jens Grigoleit, 2011. "Kapitalmarktreaktionen auf die Ankündigung des Wechsels von Vorstandsvorsitzenden in den Aufsichtsrat bei deutschen Unternehmen," Metrika: International Journal for Theoretical and Applied Statistics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 131-157, January.
    6. Aziz Jaafar & Lynn Hodgkinson & Mao-Feng Kao, 2019. "Ownership Structure, Board of Directors and Firm Performance: Evidence from Taiwan," Working Papers 19011, Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales).
    7. Nguyen, Bang Dang & Nielsen, Kasper Meisner, 2010. "The value of independent directors: Evidence from sudden deaths," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(3), pages 550-567, December.
    8. Stefanescu Cristina Alexandra, 2011. "Do Corporate Governance “Actors”’ Features Affect Banks’ Value? – Evidence From Romania," Studies in Business and Economics, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Faculty of Economic Sciences, vol. 6(2), pages 136-150, August.
    9. Sofi Mohd Fikri & Mohamed Hisham Yahya & Taufiq Hassan, 2017. "A Review on Agency Cost of Shariah Governance in Mutual Fund," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 7(1), pages 530-538.
    10. RAMDANI, Dendi & VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN, Arjen, 2009. "Board independence, CEO duality and firm performance: A quantile regression analysis for Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand," Working Papers 2009004, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    11. Phillip C. James, 2020. "Understanding the Impact of Board Structure on Firm Performance: AComprehensive Literature Review," International Journal of Business and Social Research, LAR Center Press, vol. 10(1), pages 1-12, January.
    12. Mohamed Belkhir, 2006. "Board structure, Ownership structure, and Firm performance : Evidence from Banking," Working Papers halshs-00009115, HAL.
    13. Phillip C. James, 2020. "Understanding the Impact of Board Structure on Firm Performance: AComprehensive Literature Review," International Journal of Business and Social Research, MIR Center for Socio-Economic Research, vol. 10(1), pages 1-12, January.
    14. Bradley W. Benson & Wallace N. Davidson III & Hongxia Wang & Dan L. Worrell, 2011. "Deviations from Expected Stakeholder Management, Firm Value, and Corporate Governance," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 40(1), pages 39-81, March.
    15. Premepeh, kwadwo Boateng & Odartei-Mills, Eugene, 2015. "Corporate governance structure and shareholder wealth maximisation," MPRA Paper 68087, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Ji, Jiao & Talavera, Oleksandr & Yin, Shuxing, 2016. "CEO Dismissal, Compensation and Topics of Board Meetings: The Case of China," MPRA Paper 70232, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Bill B. Francis & Iftekhar Hasan & Qiang Wu, 2012. "Do corporate boards matter during the current financial crisis?," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 21(2), pages 39-52, April.
    18. Booth, James R. & Cornett, Marcia Millon & Tehranian, Hassan, 2002. "Boards of directors, ownership, and regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(10), pages 1973-1996, October.
    19. Afzalur Rashid, 2015. "Revisiting Agency Theory: Evidence of Board Independence and Agency Cost from Bangladesh," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 181-198, August.
    20. Yu, Mei & Ashton, John K., 2015. "Board leadership structure for Chinese public listed companies," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 236-248.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    G30; L50;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:63:y:2011:i:6:d:10.1007_bf03372853. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.