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Wandelanleihen als Leistungsanreizmechanismus

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  • Marion Schulz

    (Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Während Wandelanleihen sich mittlerweile als eigene Assetklasse am kontinentaleuropäischen Kapitalmarkt etabliert haben, konnte die Frage nach den Einsatzmotiven für dieses Finanzinstrument noch nicht abschließend geklärt werden. Der vorliegende Beitrag greift diese Fragestellung auf und beschäftigt sich mit der Emission von Wandelanleihen zur Lösung des Leistungsanreizproblems in Unternehmen. Auf Basis von Reputationsüberlegungen wird ein agencytheoretisches Modell entwickelt, welches im Ergebnis zeigt, dass Wandelanleihen nicht nur ein Mittel zur Kapitalbeschaffung, sondern gleichzeitig ein effektives Managementanreizsystem darstellen, das alternativ oder ergänzend zu herkömmlichen Anreizmechanismen eingesetzt werden kann.

Suggested Citation

  • Marion Schulz, 2007. "Wandelanleihen als Leistungsanreizmechanismus," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 333-354, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:59:y:2007:i:3:d:10.1007_bf03371700
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03371700
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    G32;

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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