Cournot competition under uncertainty: conservative and optimistic equilibria
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-015-0171-z
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- A. Zapata & M. A. Caraballo & L. Monroy & A. M. Mármol, 2019. "Hurwicz’s criterion and the equilibria of duopoly models," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 27(4), pages 937-952, December.
- A. Zapata & A. M. Mármol & L. Monroy & M. A. Caraballo, 2019. "A Maxmin Approach for the Equilibria of Vector-Valued Games," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 415-432, April.
- Georgios Gerasimou, 2019.
"Dominance-solvable multicriteria games with incomplete preferences,"
Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 165-171, December.
- Georgios Gerasimou, 2014. "Dominance Solvable Multicriteria Games with Incomplete Preferences," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance 201406, School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews, revised 30 May 2018.
- D. V. Borrero & M. A. Hinojosa & A. M. Mármol, 2016. "Stable solutions for multiple scenario cost allocation games with partial information," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 245(1), pages 209-226, October.
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Keywords
Pareto equilibria; Cournot games; Uncertainty; Attitude to risk; D43; D81; L10;JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
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