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Cournot Oligopoly Under Strategic Uncertainty With Optimistic And Pessimistic Firms

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  • Fulvio Fontini

Abstract

In this paper the Cournot oligopoly under uncertainty is analyzed by means of the Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) theory. Firms are supposed to be either optimistic (CEU maximizers who hold concave capacities) or pessimistic (convex capacities). Reaction functions, equilibrium quantities, prices and profits are derived and compared for different degrees of uncertainty and uncertainty attitude (optimism or pessimism). It is proved that optimists make higher profits than pessimists whenever uncertainty is sufficiently low. If it is high just optimists participate in the market making losses. An interpretation of the main results in terms of the market's level of maturity is provided.

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  • Fulvio Fontini, 2005. "Cournot Oligopoly Under Strategic Uncertainty With Optimistic And Pessimistic Firms," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(3), pages 318-333, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:metroe:v:56:y:2005:i:3:p:318-333
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-999X.2005.00219.x
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    1. Gilboa Itzhak & Schmeidler David, 1993. "Updating Ambiguous Beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 33-49, February.
    2. Fox, Craig R & Rogers, Brett A & Tversky, Amos, 1996. "Options Traders Exhibit Subadditive Decision Weights," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 5-17, July.
    3. Dow James & Werlang Sergio Ribeiro Da Costa, 1994. "Nash Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty: Breaking Down Backward Induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 305-324, December.
    4. Epstein Larry G. & Le Breton Michel, 1993. "Dynamically Consistent Beliefs Must Be Bayesian," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 1-22, October.
    5. Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-587, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. A. Zapata & M. A. Caraballo & L. Monroy & A. M. Mármol, 2019. "Hurwicz’s criterion and the equilibria of duopoly models," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 27(4), pages 937-952, December.
    2. Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2009. "Ambiguity and social interaction," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(2), pages 355-379, April.
    3. Eddai, Nahed & Guerdjikova, Ani, 2023. "To mitigate or to adapt: How to deal with optimism, pessimism and strategic ambiguity?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 1-30.
    4. M. Caraballo & A. Mármol & L. Monroy & E. Buitrago, 2015. "Cournot competition under uncertainty: conservative and optimistic equilibria," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(2), pages 145-165, June.
    5. Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2009. "Ambiguity and social interaction," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(2), pages 355-379, April.
    6. Nahed Eddai & Ani Guerdjikova, 2023. "To mitigate or to adapt: how to deal with optimism, pessimism and strategic ambiguity?," Post-Print hal-03590990, HAL.
    7. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-03590990 is not listed on IDEAS

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