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Dominance-solvable multicriteria games with incomplete preferences

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  • Georgios Gerasimou

    (University of St Andrews)

Abstract

This paper studies dominance solvability in games with multidimensional payoffs and incomplete preferences. The main result offers a generalization of Moulin’s (Econometrica 47:1337–1351, 1979) classic equilibrium-selection theorem in this more general environment. It is shown, in particular, that a natural extension of Moulin’s dominance solvability concept in this class of “multicriteria” games is an equilibrium refinement. It is further shown that dominance solvability based on the more permissive notion of partially dominated strategies generally fails to be an equilibrium refinement in such games.

Suggested Citation

  • Georgios Gerasimou, 2019. "Dominance-solvable multicriteria games with incomplete preferences," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 165-171, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:etbull:v:7:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-018-0159-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0159-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Amparo M. Mármol & Luisa Monroy & M. Ángeles Caraballo & Asunción Zapata, 2017. "Equilibria with vector-valued utilities and preference information. The analysis of a mixed duopoly," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(3), pages 365-383, October.
    2. Sophie Bade, 2005. "Nash equilibrium in games with incomplete preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(2), pages 309-332, August.
    3. Voorneveld, Mark & Vermeulen, Dries & Borm, Peter, 1999. "Axiomatizations of Pareto Equilibria in Multicriteria Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 146-154, July.
    4. M. Caraballo & A. Mármol & L. Monroy & E. Buitrago, 2015. "Cournot competition under uncertainty: conservative and optimistic equilibria," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(2), pages 145-165, June.
    5. Zhao, Jingang, 2018. "Three little-known and yet still significant contributions of Lloyd Shapley," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 592-599.
    6. Moulin, Herve, 1979. "Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1137-1151, November.
    7. Raul P. Lejano & Helen Ingram, 2012. "Modeling the commons as a game with vector payoffs," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 24(1), pages 66-89, January.
    8. L. S. Shapley & Fred D. Rigby, 1959. "Equilibrium points in games with vector payoffs," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(1), pages 57-61, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mallozzi, Lina & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2022. "Equilibrium and dominance in fuzzy games," MPRA Paper 111386, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dominance solvability; Vector payoffs; Incomplete preferences; Multicriteria games; Equilibrium refinement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General

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