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When legislators responded to news media surveys: unstable responses, missing not at random responses, and self-censorship

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  • Bon Sang Koo

    (Chungbuk National University)

Abstract

This paper investigates how survey-based methods can create biased measures of legislators’ policy positions by analyzing the two similar surveys conducted by different news media before and after the 2012 Korean legislative election. First, basic space scaling shows that many legislators changed their policy positions in the same latent direction after the election regardless of party affiliation. Second, roll-call-based ideal point estimates confirm that missing values (nonresponse) are not randomly generated in surveys conducted by news media. Third, when legislators desiring media exposure are concerned about their answers being politically exploited by influential but ideologically slanted news media they may self-censor their responses.

Suggested Citation

  • Bon Sang Koo, 2023. "When legislators responded to news media surveys: unstable responses, missing not at random responses, and self-censorship," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 1821-1843, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:qualqt:v:57:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s11135-022-01442-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s11135-022-01442-5
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