The pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences
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- Péter Biró & Elena Inarra & Elena Molis, 2014.
"A new solution for the roommate problem: The Q-stable matchings,"
IEHAS Discussion Papers
1422, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
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More about this item
KeywordsPareto-optimal; Stable matching; Pareto-stable matching; Simple matching; Pareto-simple matching; C78; D78;
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
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