Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core
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Volume (Year): 35 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
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- Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudhölter, 1998. "The Positive Prekernel of a Cooperative Game," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 292, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Peleg, B, 1986. "On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 187-200.
- Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Keiding, Hans, 1986. "An axiomatization of the core of a cooperative game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 111-115.
- Rafels, C. & Tijs, S.H., 1997. "On the cores of cooperative games and the stability of the Weber set," Other publications TiSEM 14435da8-14ce-4845-8e54-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Lucas, William F., 1992. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 17, pages 543-590 Elsevier.
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