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Economic insights and deficits in European biotechnology patent policy

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  • Bernard Gilroy
  • Tobias Volpert

Abstract

The decisive statutory provision of the EU for patent protection of genetic engineering inventions is the so-called directive on biotechnological patents (DBP). Its objective is the encouragement of research and development in the genetic engineering sector. The following exposition shows that the DBP has two major flaws from the economist's point of view, under which particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, the driving force of this young line of business, suffer.
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Suggested Citation

  • Bernard Gilroy & Tobias Volpert, 2002. "Economic insights and deficits in European biotechnology patent policy," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 37(3), pages 150-155, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:intere:v:37:y:2002:i:3:p:150-155
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02928874
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Denicolo, Vincenzo, 1999. "The optimal life of a patent when the timing of innovation is stochastic," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(6), pages 827-846, August.
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    3. Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, 1990. "Optimal Patent Length and Breadth," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 106-112, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andreas Reinstaller & Gerhard Schwarz, 2012. "Die wirtschafts- und forschungspolitische Bedeutung der Umsetzung der Biopatentrichtlinie im österreichischen Patentgesetz," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 44635, April.
    2. Gilroy, Bernard Michael & Brandes, Wolfgang & Vollpert, Tobias, 2003. "Economic Implications of Intellectual Property Rights for the Biotechnology Sector: A Comparative Analysis of the European-Japanese Situations," MPRA Paper 17680, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L65 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology; Plastics

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