All in the family: why non-democratic leaders have more children
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Kai A. Konrad & Stergios Skaperdas, 2007.
"Succession Rules and Leadership Rents,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(4), pages 622-645, August.
- Konrad, Kai A. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2005. "Succession Rules and Leadership Rents," CEPR Discussion Papers 5206, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kai A. Konrad & Stergios Skaperdas, 2005. "Succession Rules and Leadership Rents," CESifo Working Paper Series 1534, CESifo Group Munich.
- Konrad, Kai A. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Succession rules and leadership rents," Munich Reprints in Economics 22093, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Konrad, Kai Andreas & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2005.
"Succession rules and leadership rents
[Nachfolgeregeln und die Verteilung von Renten aus Herrschaft]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2005-13, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422, March.
- Gregory D. Hess & Athanasios Orphanides, 2001. "War and Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(4), pages 776-810, August.
- Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Nzinga Broussard & Ralph Chami & Gregory Hess, 2015.
"(Why) Do self-employed parents have more children?,"
Review of Economics of the Household,
Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 297-321, June.
- Nzinga Broussard & Ralph Chami & Gregory Hess, 2003. "(Why) Do Self-Employed Parents Have More Children?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1103, CESifo Group Munich.
More about this item
KeywordsD72; H1; J13; Children; Matching; Rent-seeking; Democratic versus non-democratic leadership;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
- J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:9:y:2008:i:1:p:65-85. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .