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Modified indices of political power: a case study of a few parliaments

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  • Tomislav Marošević

    (Josip Juraj Strossmayer University of Osijek)

  • Ivan Soldo

    (Josip Juraj Strossmayer University of Osijek)

Abstract

According to yes–no voting systems, players (e.g., parties in a parliament) have some influence on making some decisions. In formal voting situations, taking into account that a majority vote is needed for making a decision, the question of political power of parties can be considered. There are some well-known indices of political power e.g., the Shapley–Shubik index, the Banzhaf index, the Johnston index, the Deegan–Packel index. In order to take into account different political nature of the parties, as the main factor for forming a winning coalition i.e., a parliamentary majority, we give a modification of the power indices. For the purpose of comparison of these indices of political power from the empirical point of view, we consider the indices of power in some cases, i.e., in relation to a few parliaments.

Suggested Citation

  • Tomislav Marošević & Ivan Soldo, 2018. "Modified indices of political power: a case study of a few parliaments," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 26(3), pages 645-657, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:cejnor:v:26:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s10100-017-0487-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s10100-017-0487-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Computing Power Indices For Large Voting Games," Economic Research Papers 269350, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    2. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Computation of Power Indices," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 644, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    3. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Computation Of Power Indices," Economic Research Papers 269457, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tomislav Marošević & Josip Miletić & Marija Miloloža Pandur, 2023. "The bounds of votes of divisor electoral methods," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 31(4), pages 1265-1280, December.
    2. Marijana Zekić-Sušac & Rudolf Scitovski & Goran Lešaja, 2018. "CEJOR special issue of Croatian Operational Research Society," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 26(3), pages 531-534, September.

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