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Regulation and Independent Regulatory Authority for Electricity Energy Market: The Case of Turkey

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  • Özgür Emre KOÇ
  • Mustafa Alpin GÜLŞEN

Abstract

The public sector is frequently intervened in the production, transmission and distribution phases of electrical products, which are an important part of social and economic life today. From this point of view, while the electricity market was under the administration of public property holders until the 1970s, the electricity market became more dominant in the private sector because of deregulation activities since the 1990s. The study describes the reasons for the regulations in the electricity sector. In addition, the role of regulators in this process (examples of Turkey and the world) are included. In our country, the scope of regulation is narrowing because there is a dependency on imports in electricity consumption. The existence of short-term and current regulations to solve current problems, rather than long-term and wide-ranging structural regulations, has a negative impact on the sector. In addition, since the 1990s, the increase in the number of participants in the sector has been a positive development in terms of competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Özgür Emre KOÇ & Mustafa Alpin GÜLŞEN, 2018. "Regulation and Independent Regulatory Authority for Electricity Energy Market: The Case of Turkey," Sosyoekonomi Journal, Sosyoekonomi Society, issue 26(38).
    • Handle: RePEc:sos:sosjrn:180403
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulation; Electricity Sector; Independent Regulatory Agencies; Turkey.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General

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