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Private health insurance and the problem of moral hazard (Prywatne ubezpieczenia zdrowotne a problem pokusy naduzycia)

Author

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  • Iwona Laskowska

    (Uniwersytet Lodzki, Katedra Ekonometrii Przestrzennej)

Abstract

In most European countries general health insurance systems are supplemented by voluntary health insurance purchased on a commercial basis. The expansion of the private health insurance market is potentially beneficial for the functioning of the health protection system and for the patients themselves. At the same time, however, particularly voluntary health insurance has certain weaknesses that may make it less effective than it could be. One of the major problems is moral hazard understood as a risk of excessive, unjustified use of medical services that bears serious economic consequences. The article focuses on moral hazard related to health insurance. In the first part of the article, the nature of the problem is discussed, as well as conclusions for European countries arising from the available studies. The second part provides insights into private health insurance in Poland.

Suggested Citation

  • Iwona Laskowska, 2015. "Private health insurance and the problem of moral hazard (Prywatne ubezpieczenia zdrowotne a problem pokusy naduzycia)," Problemy Zarzadzania, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, vol. 13(53), pages 58-68.
  • Handle: RePEc:sgm:pzwzuw:v:13:i:53:y:2015:p:58-68
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    File URL: http://pz.wz.uw.edu.pl/sites/default/files/artykuly/pz_2015_2-2_laskowska.pdf
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    File URL: http://pz.wz.uw.edu.pl/en
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    private health insurance; moral hazard;

    JEL classification:

    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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