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Динамическое Взаимодействие В Условиях Последовательного (Неповторяемого) Инвестирования

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  • Еремеечева Мария Александровна

    (Национальный исследовательский университет – Высшая школа экономики)

Abstract

Данная статья посвящена теоретическим исследованиям динамических постановок проблемы hold-up, касающихся проблематик и последовательного (неповторяемого) инвестирования. Наряду с этим выявлено неоднозначное отношение различных научных публикаций, на примере «Hold-up and sequential specific investment» Smirnov and White (2004) и «Sequential Investment, Hold-up, and Strategic Delay» J. Zhang and Y. Zhang (2011), к последовательному режиму инвестирования в качестве возможного способа элиминирования проблемы «шантажа».

Suggested Citation

  • Еремеечева Мария Александровна, 2012. "Динамическое Взаимодействие В Условиях Последовательного (Неповторяемого) Инвестирования," Journal of Economic Regulation Journal of Economic Regulation (Вопросы регулирования экономики), CyberLeninka;Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «Гуманитарные перспективы», vol. 3(4), pages 44-58.
    • Handle: RePEc:scn:029047:14039313
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Darwin V. Neher, 1999. "Staged Financing: An Agency Perspective," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(2), pages 255-274.
    2. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1993. "Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 811-837, September.
    3. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    4. Vladimir Smirnov & Andrew Wait, 2004. "Hold-up and Sequential Specific Investments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 386-400, Summer.
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