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Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata: A Survey

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  • Menezes, Flavio Marques

Abstract

In this paper we survey the recent literature on games played by finite automata. We discuss issues regarding players' rationality, procedural costs of decision making, and cooperation among players.

Suggested Citation

  • Menezes, Flavio Marques, 1992. "Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata: A Survey," Brazilian Review of Econometrics, Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria - SBE, vol. 12(1), April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sbe:breart:v:12:y:1992:i:1:a:2999
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    File URL: https://periodicos.fgv.br/bre/article/view/2999
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1990. "Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 97-117, June.
    2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
    3. Robert Axelrod, 1980. "Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(1), pages 3-25, March.
    4. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1990. "Evolutionary Stability In Repeated Games Played By Finite Automata," Working papers 90-29, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    5. Robert Axelrod, 1980. "More Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(3), pages 379-403, September.
    6. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1990. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 274-279, May.
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