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Peer loyalty and quota restriction as social norms: A case study of their emergence

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  • Francisco José León

    (University of Girona, Spain, francisco.leon@udg.edu)

Abstract

In this paper, I focus on the case of a multinational company in the automotive sector, and specifically its production plant in Barcelona. Based on the analysis of eighteen interviews carried out with workers at the company, I constructed an explanatory model of the emergence, configuration and maintenance of the shopfloor culture of the plant workers. This idioculture or shopfloor culture is characterized by the prescription of a resistance to work and the proscription of disloyalty to colleagues. The games of interaction between different types of agents generate the demand for the norms of cooperation, which form the framework of this idioculture. I also highlight some of the mechanisms responsible for the prevalence of mutual cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco José León, 2011. "Peer loyalty and quota restriction as social norms: A case study of their emergence," Rationality and Society, , vol. 23(1), pages 75-115, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:23:y:2011:i:1:p:75-115
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463110377300
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    References listed on IDEAS

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