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Cultural Evolution, Disproportionate Prior Exposure and the Problem of Cooperation

Author

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  • Howard T. Welser

    (Institute for the Social Sciences, Cornell University, 151 Myron Taylor Hall, Ithaca, NY14850, USA, htw3@cornell.edu)

  • Eric Gleave

    (University of Washington)

  • Deborah S. Vaughan

    (University of Washington Business School, Department of Management and Organization)

Abstract

How can disproportionate prior exposure cause a behavior to evolve in a population? This article investigates how this mechanism might evolve cooperation in a manner that can overcome the tendency towards defection in human societies. We extend Mark's analysis by testing his emulation model in a social setting where defection is likely, and we offer new models that more accurately capture the learning process of disproportionate prior exposure. Our results suggest that this mechanism can account for some evolution of cooperation, and that its strength is greatly influenced by conditions that alter actors' perceptions of the joint distribution of fitness and cooperation. We conclude by discussing how cultural mechanisms like stories and myths may magnify the evolutionary potential of disproportionate prior exposure in cultural evolution.

Suggested Citation

  • Howard T. Welser & Eric Gleave & Deborah S. Vaughan, 2007. "Cultural Evolution, Disproportionate Prior Exposure and the Problem of Cooperation," Rationality and Society, , vol. 19(2), pages 171-202, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:19:y:2007:i:2:p:171-202
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463107075109
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    References listed on IDEAS

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