IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jothpo/v6y1994i4p449-472.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

3. The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and Institutions

Author

Listed:
  • Duncan Snidal

Abstract

The international relations (IR) and common-pool resource (CPR) literatures disagree on the impact of increasing numbers of actors on collective action. They also disagree on the impact of actor heterogeneity. These differences can be understood in terms of the endogeneity of institutions, exemplified here by membership rules. The number and variety of actors need not be an exogenous aspect of a collective-action problem but rather may be determined as part of the institutional rules. Successful CPRs regulate their membership either through exclusion or by enforcing contributions. In some cases this is supported by nesting in external institutions, in other cases enforcement is decentralized and in yet other cases collective action is achieved through locally centralized arrangements. This latter category suggests a much richer range of possible institutional solutions than is found in standard IR conceptions of anarchy or hierarchy. In terms of the various types of actor heterogeneity discussed in the paper, it suggests a need for better understanding of the role of `community' in supporting collective action at both the local and international levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Duncan Snidal, 1994. "3. The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and Institutions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(4), pages 449-472, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:6:y:1994:i:4:p:449-472
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692894006004003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951692894006004003
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0951692894006004003?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Krasner, Stephen D., 1982. "Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(2), pages 185-205, April.
    2. Kahler, Miles, 1992. "Multilateralism with small and large numbers," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(3), pages 681-708, July.
    3. Stein, Arthur A., 1982. "Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(2), pages 299-324, April.
    4. Sims, Christopher A, 1980. "Macroeconomics and Reality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(1), pages 1-48, January.
    5. Snidal, Duncan, 1991. "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(3), pages 701-726, September.
    6. Bendor, Jonathan & Mookherjee, Dilip, 1987. "Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 129-154, March.
    7. Wagner, R. Harrison, 1993. "What was bipolarity?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 77-106, January.
    8. Snidal, Duncan, 1985. "The limits of hegemonic stability theory," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(4), pages 579-614, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bernhard Reinsberg & Centre for Business Research, 2018. "Blockchain Technology and International Relations: Decentralised Solutions To Foster Cooperation In An Anarchic World?," Working Papers wp508, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    2. Kjell Hausken & Thomas Plumper, 1998. "The impact of actor heterogeneity on the provision of international public goods," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(1), pages 61-94, August.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lisa L. Martin, 1994. "4. Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(4), pages 473-493, October.
    2. Phillip M. Hannam & Vítor V. Vasconcelos & Simon A. Levin & Jorge M. Pacheco, 2017. "Incomplete cooperation and co-benefits: deepening climate cooperation with a proliferation of small agreements," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 65-79, September.
    3. John Ravenhill, 2012. "The Numbers Game in Asia-Pacific Cooperation," Chapters, in: Christopher M. Dent & Jörn Dosch (ed.), The Asia-Pacific, Regionalism and the Global System, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Sebastian Krapohl & Václav Ocelík & Dawid M. Walentek, 2021. "The instability of globalization: applying evolutionary game theory to global trade cooperation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(1), pages 31-51, July.
    5. Genschel, Philipp & Werle, Raymund, 1992. "From National Hierarchies to International Standardization: Historical and Modal Changes in the Coordination of Telecommunications," MPIfG Discussion Paper 92/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    6. Thomas Willett, 1999. "Developments in the Political Economy of Policy Coordination," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 221-253, May.
    7. Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom, 1994. "1. Introduction," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(4), pages 403-428, October.
    8. John Kunkel, 1998. "Realism and Postwar US Trade Policy," Asia Pacific Economic Papers 285, Australia-Japan Research Centre, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    9. Stephen, Matthew D. & Parízek, Michal, 2019. "New Powers and the Distribution of Preferences in Global Trade Governance: From Deadlock and Drift to Fragmentation," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 24(6), pages 735-758.
    10. Kobrin, Stephen J., 2015. "Is a global nonmarket strategy possible? Economic integration in a multipolar world order," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 262-272.
    11. Schneider, Volker & Werle, Raymund, 1988. "Regime oder korporativer Akteur? Die EG in der Telekommunikationspolitik," MPIfG Discussion Paper 88/4, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    12. GAOMBALET, Célestin Guy-Serge, 2020. "Puissance et Coopération dans les Relations économiques internationales [Power and cooperation in international economic relations]," MPRA Paper 100072, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 Apr 2020.
    13. Carla Norrlof & Simon Reich, 2015. "American and Chinese leadership during the global financial crisis: Testing Kindleberger’s stabilization functions," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 18(3), pages 227-250, September.
    14. Oran R. Young, 1994. "2. The Problem of Scale in Human/Environment Relationships," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(4), pages 429-447, October.
    15. Pierre Berthaud & Tancrède Voituriez, 2013. "BASIC effect on global climate governance. Power changes and regime shifts," Post-Print halshs-00868468, HAL.
    16. Stephen J. Majeski & Shane Fricks, 1995. "Conflict And Cooperation in International Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 39(4), pages 622-645, December.
    17. James Ashley Morrison & Avery F. White, 2011. "International Regimes and War," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 18, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    18. Robert Pahre, 1994. "Multilateral Cooperation in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(2), pages 326-352, June.
    19. Benjamin Zyla, 2018. "Beyond the 2% fetishism: studying the practice of collective action in transatlantic affairs," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 4(1), pages 1-11, December.
    20. Hansen, Lars Peter, 2013. "Uncertainty Outside and Inside Economic Models," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2013-7, Nobel Prize Committee.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:6:y:1994:i:4:p:449-472. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.