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International Regimes and War

In: The Handbook on the Political Economy of War

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  • James Ashley Morrison
  • Avery F. White

Abstract

By defining political economy and war in the broadest sense, this unique Handbook brings together a wide range of interdisciplinary scholars from economics, political science, sociology, and policy studies to address a multitude of important topics. These include an analysis of why wars begin, how wars are waged, what happens after war has ceased, and the various alternatives to war. Other sections explore civil war and revolution, the arms trade, economic and political systems, and post-conflict reconstruction and nation building. Policymakers as well as academics and students of political science, economics, public policy and sociology will find this volume to be an engaging and enlightening read.

Suggested Citation

  • James Ashley Morrison & Avery F. White, 2011. "International Regimes and War," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 18, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:13385_18
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ruggie, John Gerard, 1982. "International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(2), pages 379-415, April.
    2. Goldstein, Judith & Gowa, Joanne, 2002. "US national power and the post-war trading regime," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(2), pages 153-170, July.
    3. Schultz, Kenneth A. & Weingast, Barry R., 2003. "The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(1), pages 3-42, January.
    4. Strange, Susan, 1987. "The Persistent myth of lost hegemony," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(4), pages 551-574, October.
    5. Wendt, Alexander, 1992. "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 391-425, April.
    6. Grieco, Joseph M., 1988. "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(3), pages 485-507, July.
    7. Grieco, Joseph & Powell, Robert & Snidal, Duncan, 1993. "The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 729-743, September.
    8. Snidal, Duncan, 1985. "The limits of hegemonic stability theory," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(4), pages 579-614, October.
    9. Lembke B., 1918. "√ a. p," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 111(1), pages 709-712, February.
    10. Snidal, Duncan, 1991. "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(3), pages 701-726, September.
    11. Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), 2011. "The Handbook on the Political Economy of War," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13385.
    12. Powell, Robert, 1991. "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(4), pages 1303-1320, December.
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