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Decentralized legislative oversight of bureaucratic policy making

Author

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  • Janna King
  • Sean Gailmard
  • Abby Wood

Abstract

Congressional oversight is a potentially potent tool to affect policy making and implementation by executive agencies. However, oversight of any agency is dispersed among several committees across the House and Senate. How does this decentralization affect the strategic incentives for oversight by each committee? And how do the strategic incentives of oversight committees align with the collective interest of Congress as a whole? We develop a formal, spatial model of decentralized oversight to investigate these questions. The model shows that when committees have similar interests in affecting agency policy, committees attempt to free ride on each other, and oversight levels are inefficiently low. But if committees have competing interests in affecting agency policy, they engage in “dueling oversight†with little overall effect, and oversight levels are inefficiently high. Overall, we contend that committee oversight incentives do not generally align with the collective interests of Congress, and the problem cannot be easily solved by structural changes within a single chamber.

Suggested Citation

  • Janna King & Sean Gailmard & Abby Wood, 2023. "Decentralized legislative oversight of bureaucratic policy making," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 35(4), pages 292-309, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:35:y:2023:i:4:p:292-309
    DOI: 10.1177/09516298231202428
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-277, Fall.
    4. Wood, B. Dan & Waterman, Richard W., 1991. "The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(3), pages 801-828, September.
    5. Bawn, Kathleen, 1997. "Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 101-126, April.
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    8. Macdonald, Jason A., 2010. "Limitation Riders and Congressional Influence over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 104(4), pages 766-782, November.
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