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Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight

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  • Joshua D. Clinton
  • David E. Lewis
  • Jennifer L. Selin

Abstract

Does the president or Congress have more influence over policymaking by the bureaucracy? Despite a wealth of theoretical guidance, progress on this important question has proven elusive due to competing theoretical predictions and severe difficulties in measuring agency influence and oversight. We use a survey of federal executives to assess political influence, congressional oversight, and the policy preferences of agencies, committees, and the president on a comparable scale. Analyzing variation in political influence across and within agencies reveals that Congress is less influential relative to the White House when more committees are involved. While increasing the number of involved committees may maximize the electoral benefits for members, it may also undercut the ability of Congress as an institution to collectively respond to the actions of the presidency or the bureaucracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua D. Clinton & David E. Lewis & Jennifer L. Selin, 2014. "Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 58(2), pages 387-401, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:58:y:2014:i:2:p:387-401
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12066
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    Cited by:

    1. Min-Seok Pang, 2017. "Politics and Information Technology Investments in the U.S. Federal Government in 2003–2016," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(1), pages 33-45, March.
    2. Zach Raff, 2023. "Identifying the regulator’s objective: Does political support matter?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(3), pages 277-295, March.
    3. Breig, Zachary & Downey, Mitch, 2021. "Agency breadth and political influence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 188(C), pages 253-268.
    4. Erick Behar-Villegas & Pablo Sanabria-Pulido & Paul J. Hasselbrinck-Macias, 2022. "Las “ías”, entes de control y fiscalía en cifras: politización e inefectividad en la gestión pública entre múltiples capas de control," Documentos de trabajo 20760, Escuela de Gobierno - Universidad de los Andes.
    5. John M. de Figueiredo & Edward H. Stiglitz, 2015. "Democratic Rulemaking," NBER Working Papers 21765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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