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Handicaps to improve reputation

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  • Amihai Glazer

Abstract

An agent may be able to address a task at different times, with the state of nature more favorable to the task in some periods than in others. Success on a task will therefore more greatly improve the agent’s reputation if he is constrained in choosing when to address the task than if he enjoys flexibility in timing. These considerations can explain why presidents emphasize achievements in their first 100 days in office, and why performance of the economy in only some periods of a president’s term affect elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Amihai Glazer, 2015. "Handicaps to improve reputation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(3), pages 485-496, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:27:y:2015:i:3:p:485-496
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629814556172
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    References listed on IDEAS

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