IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jospec/v14y2013i4p368-388.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Efficiency and Managerial Performance in FBS College Football

Author

Listed:
  • Joel G. Maxcy

Abstract

This article develops a model of managerial efficiency for National Collegiate Athletic Association’s top division college football coaches. The derived efficiency measures are then linked to the hiring and firing process. The work concludes with an evaluation of the effect of head coach succession on team performance. This study evaluates coaching efficiency in terms of both use of talent and recruiting talent. The constructed efficiency rankings are used to evaluate hiring and firing decisions and determine the degree that each type of efficiency plays in these decisions. Last, the efficiency of the market is assessed by evaluating whether universities are making a good choice and are able on average to improve performance when replacing an underperforming coach. The empirical results indicate that both constructs of efficiency matter. Coaches who exhibit high level of both types of efficiencies regularly move up to the most lucrative jobs. Replacement of poor performing coach is most often a wise decision.

Suggested Citation

  • Joel G. Maxcy, 2013. "Efficiency and Managerial Performance in FBS College Football," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 14(4), pages 368-388, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:14:y:2013:i:4:p:368-388
    DOI: 10.1177/1527002513497170
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1527002513497170
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/1527002513497170?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John L. Fizel & Michael P. D'Itri, 1997. "Managerial Efficiency, Managerial Succession and Organizational Performance," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(4), pages 295-308.
    2. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    3. Clement, Robert C & McCormick, Robert E, 1989. "Coaching Team Production," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(2), pages 287-304, April.
    4. Herda Trent J & Ryan Eric D & DeFreitas Jason M & Costa Pablo B & Walter Ashley A & Hoge Katherine M & Weir Joseph P & Cramer Joel T, 2009. "Can Recruiting Rankings Predict the Success of NCAA Division I Football Teams? An Examination of the Relationships among Rivals and Scouts Recruiting Rankings and Jeff Sagarin End-of-Season Ratings in," Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, De Gruyter, vol. 5(4), pages 1-13, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Diehl Kevin A., 2017. "How the Big Ten West Was Won: Football Recruiting," Management of Organizations: Systematic Research, Sciendo, vol. 77(1), pages 25-35, June.
    2. Stacey L. Brook, 2021. "A Comparison of NCAA FBS Head Coaches Salary Determination From New and Modified Contracts," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 22(5), pages 491-513, June.
    3. Kurt W. Rotthoff & Kaylyn R. Sanbower, 2016. "Professional ‘amateurs’ in the NCAA: the impact of downstream demand," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(5), pages 373-376, March.
    4. Ira Horowitz, 2017. "An Efficiency Evaluation of Men’s College Basketball Coaches," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 62(1), pages 77-98, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Martin B. Schmidt & David J. Berri, 2006. "Research Note: What Takes Them Out to the Ball Game?," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 7(2), pages 222-233, May.
    2. Mirabile, McDonald & Witte, Mark, 2012. "Can schools buy success in college football? Coach compensation, expenditures and performance," MPRA Paper 40642, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Wang Wenge, 2018. "Board Independence of Listed Companies in the US and China," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(3), pages 1-21, December.
    4. Benkraiem, Ramzi & Boubaker, Sabri & Brinette, Souad & Khemiri, Sabrina, 2021. "Board feminization and innovation through corporate venture capital investments: The moderating effects of independence and management skills," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    5. Shaikh, Ibrahim A. & O'Brien, Jonathan Paul & Peters, Lois, 2018. "Inside directors and the underinvestment of financial slack towards R&D-intensity in high-technology firms," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 192-201.
    6. Dirk Sliwka, 2001. "On the Costs and Benefits of Delegation in Organizations," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(4), pages 568-590, December.
    7. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2007-059 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Etienne Redor & Magnus Blomkvist, 2021. "Do all inside and affiliated directors hold the same value for shareholders?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 41(3), pages 882-895.
    9. Agnès Labye & Christine Lagoutte & Françoise Renversez, 2002. "Banques mutualistes et systèmes financiers : une analyse comparative Allemagne, Grande-Bretagne, France," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 67(3), pages 85-109.
    10. Martin Kyere & Marcel Ausloos, 2021. "Corporate governance and firms financial performance in the United Kingdom," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(2), pages 1871-1885, April.
    11. Z. Jun Lin & Shengqiang Liu & Fangcheng Sun, 2017. "The Impact of Financing Constraints and Agency Costs on Corporate R&D Investment: Evidence from China," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 17(1), pages 3-42, March.
    12. Tleubayev, Alisher & Bobojonov, Ihtiyor & Gagalyuk, Taras & Glauben, Thomas, 2020. "Board gender diversity and firm performance: Evidence from the Russian agri-food industry," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 23(1), pages 35-53.
    13. Glenn Boyle & Graeme Guthrie & Luke Gorton, 2010. "Holding onto Your Horses: Conflicts of Interest in Asset Management," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(4), pages 689-713.
    14. Kim, Jongwook & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2008. "A Strategic Theory of the Firm as a Nexus of Incomplete Contracts: A Property Rights Approach," Working Papers 08-0108, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    15. Ferrell, Allen & Liang, Hao & Renneboog, Luc, 2016. "Socially responsible firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 585-606.
    16. Anna Görlitz & Michael Dobler, 2023. "Financial accounting for deferred taxes: a systematic review of empirical evidence," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 73(1), pages 113-165, February.
    17. Wu, Jianfeng & Tu, Rungting, 2007. "CEO stock option pay and R&D spending: a behavioral agency explanation," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 60(5), pages 482-492, May.
    18. Jankovic Ivan, 2010. "Firm as a Nexus of Markets," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 1-29, October.
    19. Wu, Chloe Yu-Hsuan & Hsu, Hwa-Hsien & Haslam, Jim, 2016. "Audit committees, non-audit services, and auditor reporting decisions prior to failure," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 240-256.
    20. Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 20, pages 1769-1823, Elsevier.
    21. Tang, Xuesong & Lin, Yan & Peng, Qing & Du, Jun & Chan, Kam C., 2016. "Politically connected directors and firm value: Evidence from forced resignations in China," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 148-167.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:14:y:2013:i:4:p:368-388. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.