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Balanced Strategies for Prisoner's Dilemma

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  • Michael Orkin

    (Department of Statistics, California State University, Hayward)

Abstract

When is a strategy cooperative, yet safe from invasion? A mathematical characterization of such strategies is given, which I call “balanced.†I show that tit-for-tat is balanced, and, in general, a strategy is balanced if and only if its probability of defection on a particular move is sufficiently large relative to the opponent's cumulative score and sufficiently low relative to its own cumulative score.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Orkin, 1987. "Balanced Strategies for Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(1), pages 186-191, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:31:y:1987:i:1:p:186-191
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002787031001010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Smale, Steve, 1980. "The Prisoner's Dilemma and Dynamical Systems Associated to Non-Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(7), pages 1617-1634, November.
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