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Armaments, Detente, and Bureaucracy

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  • Hans Rattinger

    (Program for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University)

Abstract

This study explores the extent to which defense spending of the European nations of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact since 1950 can be characterized as an action-reaction process. Since the level of armament expenditures in any state is an outcome of organizational processes, a model is introduced that represents the “normal†growth of defense spending as a function of bureaucratic momentum. Deviations from these expected levels are then treated as reactions to the potential adversary's pattern of military spending and/or to the fluctuations of tension in Europe. The most important findings are (a) the comparatively low influence of action-reaction and international tension–as opposed to that of bureaucratic momentum, and (b) the differential impact of the hostile alliance's armament expenditures and of tension on, respectively, the NATO nations and the Warsaw Pact countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans Rattinger, 1975. "Armaments, Detente, and Bureaucracy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 19(4), pages 571-595, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:19:y:1975:i:4:p:571-595
    DOI: 10.1177/002200277501900401
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Davis, Otto A. & Dempster, M. A. H. & Wildavsky, Aaron, 1966. "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 529-547, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ron Smith & J. Paul Dunne & Eftychia Nikolaidou, 2000. "The econometrics of arms races," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(1), pages 31-43.

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