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Is the Bureaucrat the Main Responsible for Corruption?

Listed author(s):
  • Gerasimos T. Soldatos

    ()

    (American University of Athens, Athens, Greece)

The combination of a simple game-theoretic interaction between two firms bidding for a public project and the possibility of moral hazard on the part of the public official who is in charge of this project results in the proposition that there cannot be corruption unless the public official signals so. The result is lower quantity and quality of the goods and services offered through public projects. The combination of a simple game-theoretic interaction between two firms bidding for a public project and the possibility of moral hazard on the part of the public official who is in charge of this project results in the proposition that there cannot be corruption unless the public official signals so. The result is lower quantity and quality of the goods and services offered through public projects

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File URL: http://reaser.eu/RePec/rse/wpaper/REASER12_3Soldatos_p12-18.pdf
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Article provided by Pro Global Science Association in its journal Published in Review of Applied Socio-Economic Research.

Volume (Year): 12 (2016)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Pages: 12-18

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Handle: RePEc:rse:wpaper:v:12:y:2016:i:2:p:12-18
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