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Is the Bureaucrat the Main Responsible for Corruption?

Author

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  • Gerasimos T. Soldatos

    () (American University of Athens, Athens, Greece)

Abstract

The combination of a simple game-theoretic interaction between two firms bidding for a public project and the possibility of moral hazard on the part of the public official who is in charge of this project results in the proposition that there cannot be corruption unless the public official signals so. The result is lower quantity and quality of the goods and services offered through public projects. The combination of a simple game-theoretic interaction between two firms bidding for a public project and the possibility of moral hazard on the part of the public official who is in charge of this project results in the proposition that there cannot be corruption unless the public official signals so. The result is lower quantity and quality of the goods and services offered through public projects

Suggested Citation

  • Gerasimos T. Soldatos, 2016. "Is the Bureaucrat the Main Responsible for Corruption?," Review of Applied Socio-Economic Research, Pro Global Science Association, vol. 12(2), pages 12-18, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:rse:wpaper:v:12:y:2016:i:2:p:12-18
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    File URL: http://reaser.eu/RePec/rse/wpaper/REASER12_3Soldatos_p12-18.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Erotokritos Varelas, 2017. "Is bank lending corruption self-regulatory? A note," Discussion Paper Series 2017_03, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised Mar 2017.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    public project; moral hazard; public official corruption;

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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