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Empirical Test of a Separating Equilibrium in National Football League Contract Negotiations


  • Mike Conlin


I empirically test for a separating equilibrium in the bargaining contract of National Football League (NFL) contract negotiations. The separating equilibrium predicts that a player who delays contractual agreement signs a more lucrative contract and has positive private information on his ability level at the time of contract negotiations. These predictions are tested using data on 1,873 players selected in the 1986 through 1991 NFL drafts. The empirical results support the implications of the separating equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Mike Conlin, 1999. "Empirical Test of a Separating Equilibrium in National Football League Contract Negotiations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 289-304, Summer.
  • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:30:y:1999:i:summer:p:289-304

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Borghesi, Richard, 2008. "Allocation of scarce resources: Insight from the NFL salary cap," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 60(6), pages 536-550.
    2. Lynne G. Zucker & Michael R. Darby & Maximo Torero, 2002. "Labor Mobility from Academe to Commerce," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(3), pages 629-660, July.
    3. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul & Stango, Victor, 2004. "The Causes of Bargaining Failure: Evidence from Major League Baseball," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(2), pages 543-568, October.
    4. Conlin, Michael & Orsini, Joe & Tang, Meng-Chi, 2013. "The effect of an agent’s expertise on National Football League contract structure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 275-281.

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