Insurance Markets with Loss-Prevention Activity: Profits, Market Structure, and Consumer Welfare
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Hofmann, Annette, 2005. "Internalizing externalities of loss-prevention through insurance monopoly: An analysis of interdependent risks," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 16, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
- Jiazhen Peng & Xiaojun Shan & Yang Gao & Yohannes Kesete & Rachel Davidson & Linda Nozick & Jamie Kruse, 2014. "Modeling the integrated roles of insurance and retrofit in managing natural disaster risk: a multi-stakeholder perspective," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 74(2), pages 1043-1068, November.
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