On the Economics of Repeat Buying
This article presents a theory of such phenomena as coupons valid for the next purchase of a good and high initiation fees for clubs. In these cases the price of a nondurable good is lowered for second-time buyers. We show here that this can be explained by a model in which a monopolist sells a good, and the buyers are uncertain of their taste for the product but not of the quality of the product per se.
Volume (Year): 15 (1984)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.rje.org|
|Order Information:||Web: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:15:y:1984:i:autumn:p:396-403. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.