On the Economics of Repeat Buying
This article presents a theory of such phenomena as coupons valid for the next purchase of a good and high initiation fees for clubs. In these cases the price of a nondurable good is lowered for second-time buyers. We show here that this can be explained by a model in which a monopolist sells a good, and the buyers are uncertain of their taste for the product but not of the quality of the product per se.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 15 (1984)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.rje.org|
|Order Information:||Web: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi|