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Leaving Office: The U.S. Senator’s Representation, Ideological Adoption, and Strategic Retirement

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  • Jangsup Choi

Abstract

This study focuses on the incumbent senator’s ideological congruence causing strategic retirement in the United States. The extent of ideological congruence between a senator and her constituency can be interpreted as the degree of electoral vulnerability. Senators out of steps with constituents are more likely than those toeing the line with constituents’ preferences to choose voluntary retirement over being risk losing the general election. This study finds that senators with legislative records of relatively ideological incongruence to her state ideology will be more likely to decide to retire strategically.

Suggested Citation

  • Jangsup Choi, 2017. "Leaving Office: The U.S. Senator’s Representation, Ideological Adoption, and Strategic Retirement," International Journal of Social Science Studies, Redfame publishing, vol. 5(10), pages 17-27, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:rfa:journl:v:5:y:2017:i:10:p:17-27
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wright, Gerald C. & Berkman, Michael B., 1986. "Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(2), pages 567-588, June.
    2. Jamie L. Carson & Gregory Koger & Matthew J. Lebo & Everett Young, 2010. "The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 598-616, July.
    3. Hall, Richard L. & Van Houweling, Robert P., 1995. "Avarice and Ambition in Congress: Representatives' Decisions to Run or Retire from the U.S. House," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(1), pages 121-136, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    U.S. senator; strategic retirement; representation; ideological congruence; constituency; reelection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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