Las reformas de la financiación autonómica: elementos para una aproximación desde la economía política

Resumen:En este trabajo se realiza una aproximación en términos de economía política al proceso de descentralización en España. Se describen las reformas del sistema de financiación autonómica desde 1986, exponiendo el contexto político y los principales resultados de cada una de ellas. A la luz de los hechos, se formulan algunas conjeturas -pendientes de mayor contraste empírico- que se deducen de la teoría del federalismo fiscal. Los resultados del proceso parecen reflejar bien los intereses de los ciudadanos y responderían tanto a los principios de la teoría normativa del federalismo fiscal como a las preferencias de un votante mediano de ámbito nacional.Abstract:The aim of this paper is to analyze the fiscal decentralization process in Spain from a political economy perspective. We describe the five reforms that have taken place since 1986, showing the political context and the economic results of each one of them. These processes have triggered a series of sequences very similar in time, with an approximate five year periodicity. Specifically, the system was reformed in 1986, 1992-93, 1996-98, 2001 and 2009. Before each round of negotiation beings, it is not uncommon to find criticism towards the way the current model functions, that blames the system’s "deficiencies" for the accountability of service management issues and for the results in terms of deficit and public debt. With this criticism, usually comes reform proposals, more or less developed, that have an impact on the aspects that benefit to the respective proponents. Once initiated the process of negotiation, the dialog with the central government is materialized very differently among the “key regions” and the rest. It is also frequent the establishment of “regional coalitions” based in common interests and that go beyond the political affiliation of governments. Generally, the negotiation process – bilateral and quite opaque – concludes with the elaboration of a proposal from the central government, which is submitted to the approval – multilateral – of the Council of Fiscal and Financial Policy (CPFF). Once approved, the new model is subscribed in a joint commission with the Central government, in order to have the individual adhesion of each autonomous community manifested. At this time, the majority of regions present a positive vision of the agreement, putting forward the achievements and trying to capitalize them politically. It is important to highlight that while the central government does not publish quantitative estimations of the results, the regions usually do it in very favorable terms. Passed the first few years – sometimes only a few months –, the model ends up being questioned once again. Within the framework of the fiscal federalism theory, we have explored some hypothesis which will need to be tested in further research. Our analysis of reforms tackles, as starting point, the approach of the fiscal federalism second generation theory, under which these reforms are the result of a political negotiation process in which mainly intervene the central government and the regional governments. The central government is responsible for maximization of the national electoral result, whereas within the other governments, political and economic differences exist and condition their role in the negotiation process. We refer to the economic and fiscal capacity, the demographic weigh (electoral), the higher or lower political affinity with the central government, the presence of nationalist parties and the threats of secession, or the existence of voters with different voting loyalty depending on the elections, or the level of participation in the different elections. The goal is, as we said, to analyze the reforms of the system under a simple premise: politics do matter, and one of the keys of the process may be the “political capital” of each region, understood as a combination of the mentioned factors. The empirical literature states that, although the transfers received by regional jurisdictions are in accordance with the necessity criteria – the one that was sustained by the first generation fiscal federalism theory –, the political factors are an essential determinant for intergovernmental transfers. Nevertheless, if Spain has been organized as a strongly decentralized State, it was in response to different preferences between territories, seeking a better well-being for the whole society. Recent studies show that preferences for decentralization are heterogeneous among the territory, and are more accentuated in the first autonomic communities that gained access to higher thresholds of competences, especially the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, or Andalusia. To sum up, the results of the thirty years process seem to reflect properly the citizens’ interests. From our point of view, the Spanish regional funding system is an example of the classical normative theory of fiscal federalism and reflects the preferences of the national average voter.