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Del desespero de Greenspan a la esperanza de Obama: las bases científicas de la cooperación como principios de regulación

  • Yochai Benkler


    (Universidad de Harvard)

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    A common assumption, often accepted by regulators – that individuals act only in their narrow self-interest – is false. Evidence from both the natural and social sciences suggests that most people are strongly motivated to cooperate and help one another. Organizations (such as Toyota and Wikipedia) that cultivate and take advantage of these inclinations have prospered. Policy can be designed to incorporate attitudes toward cooperation, and to channel these tendencies in productive directions.

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    Article provided by Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía in its journal Revista de Economía Institucional.

    Volume (Year): 12 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 23 (July-December)
    Pages: 29-53

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    Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:12:y:2010:i:23:p:29-53
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    1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers 010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
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