Cambios en las concesiones viales en Uruguay: un análisis basado en la teoría de subastas
In this paper we analyze the impact on the value of future investments that would derive from the privatization of a state-owned road concessionaire, taking into account the ability of the government to handle the asymmetry of information vis à vis the concessionaire. A model based on auction theory is developed in order to quantify the expected impact on government from the privatization of the concessionaire assuming the concession contract is not modified. We conclude that if the government decides to privatize the concessionaire, significant changes are required in the concession contract, especially in the absence of institutional transformations that would improve the government supervisory and control capability.
Volume (Year): 12 (2010)
Issue (Month): 22 (January-June)
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- Krishna, Vijay, 2002. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 1, number 9780124262973.
- Andrés Pereyra, 2004. "Concesiones por mayor valor presente de los egresos. El caso de la Megaconcesión en Uruguay," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1104, Department of Economics - dECON.
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